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Abstract 
Various causal attribution theories, starting with the covariation model, argue that 
people use consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information to causally explain 
events and behaviors. Yet the visual presentation of the covariation model in the form of 
a cube is based on the assumptions that these dimension generally affect attributions 
independently, symmetrically, and to equal extents. A Gricean analysis suggests that 
these assumptions may not generally hold in the case of causal judgments for verbally 
communicated interpersonal events. We had participants judge the causal role of an 
actor and a patient in interpersonal events that were described through actor-verb-
patient sentences under high versus low consensus and distinctiveness (Study 1-2-3) or 
without such information (Study 2-3). As predicted by Gricean logic, consensus and 
distinctiveness effects on causality ratings depended on the target whose causal role 
participants assessed, on the information about the alternative dimension, and, most 
consistently, on consensus and distinctiveness being high versus low. 
Key words: Causal attribution, covariation model, logic of conversations, consensus 
information, distinctiveness information 
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A Gricean Approach to the Use Of Consensus And Distinctiveness in Causal 
Attributions of Verbally Described Interpersonal Events 
Why did Peter kiss Mary? Why did Mary invite Peter? People often wonder why 
interpersonal events occur. In many cases, they base their attributions on limited 
information. For instance, people often know of the events and about these events’ 
contexts through what others tell them. As causal attributions subsequently affect how 
observers respond to those involved, it is important to understand how these observers 
answer attribution questions. We therefore examined how people pass causal judgments 
about interpersonal events they know of through hearsay. 
One influential model of causal attributions is Kelley’s covariation model (Kelley, 
1967, 1973). It was not specifically developed to explain attributions of interpersonal 
events, let alone interpersonal events about which people are solely informed through 
verbal descriptions. Yet, empirical tests have included a mixture of social and nonsocial 
events and most have used verbal behavioral descriptions as stimulus materials. It 
seems, then, that users of the covariation model assume that attributions of social and 
nonsocial events obey the same rules and that verbal descriptions of behaviors are 
functionally equivalent to directly observed behaviors. 
At least three more specific assumptions implicitly underlie the covariation model. 
These include the ideas that people use information about different covariation 
dimensions to a similar extent, that they consider information on a dimension 
independently from the information on other dimensions, and that they weigh high and 
low levels equally. In the case of verbally described interpersonal events, however, an 
application of Grice (1975)’s analysis of human conversation suggests that these 
assumptions may not always hold. We therefore examined the validity of the 
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assumptions underlying the covariation model by testing hypotheses derived from a 
Gricean approach. More specifically, we tested an attribution question hypothesis 
(stating that the use of consensus and distinctiveness depends on whose causal role 
people assess), an interdependence hypothesis (stating that the use of consensus and 
distinctiveness depends on information about the alternative dimension), and an 
asymmetry hypothesis (stating that high versus low consensus and distinctiveness affect 
causal judgments to different extents). Before explaining how and why the covariation 
model challenges the assumptions of the covariation model, however, we will briefly 
describe the model. 
The covariation model 
The covariation model, also known as the cube model, states that people arrive at 
causal attributions by scrutinizing, besides information about the to-be-explained event 
itself, different types of contextual information. People examine how the to-be-
explained events covary with actors, patients, and subsequent occurrences, and derive 
causal attributions from the observed covariation. Stated differently, the model states 
that people consider contextual information on the dimensions of consensus, 
distinctiveness, and consistency. 
Consensus is about the uniqueness of the actor’s behavior. It is high if many people 
behave similarly (e.g. many people kiss Mary) and low if few people behave similarly. 
Distinctiveness is about the uniqueness of the patient’s treatment. It is high if few 
people are similarly treated (e.g. Nobody else gets kissed) and low if many people are 
similarly treated. Consistency is about how uniformly the event occurs over times and 
circumstances. It is high if the event occurs at several times and in various situations 
(e.g. Peter often kisses Mary) and low if it happens at specific times or in specific 
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circumstances only. Actor attributions occur if consensus and distinctiveness are low 
and consistency is high. Patient attributions occur if consensus, distinctiveness, and 
consistency are high. Other combinations provoke attributions to situational factors or 
to interactions between the actor, the patient, and the situation.  
The covariation model does not detail how people weigh covariation information. 
Yet, the absence of any specification of factors affecting the use of the dimensions as 
well as the model’s graphical presentation as a perfect cube suggest that people use each 
type of dimension to a similar extent and that they treat information about high and low 
positions in a symmetrical manner. Finally, people are assumed to collect and use 
information about any given dimension regardless of the information they have already 
available about any other dimension. If, for instance, an observer happens to first notice 
that distinctiveness is high, then this observation is supposedly irrelevant for the extent 
to which that observer subsequently searches and uses consensus information. It is only 
after all available covariation information is gathered that the covariation pattern is 
determined and the dimensions of covariation together determine the observer’s causal 
conclusion. 
Tests of the covariation model have yielded inconsistent results. Many studies 
showed that people can and sometimes do apply the covariation principle to the 
dimensions identified by the model and as the model predicts (e.g. Iacobucci & McGill, 
1990). Yet, other studies revealed that even when applying the covariation principle 
people do not always consider any information on any dimension equally important, nor 
uniformly use it. One explanation for the inconsistency is that different studies focused 
on different aspects of the attribution process. Preferences concerning the acquisition of 
information or concerning the normative judgment of information may well be 
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dissociated from preferences concerning actual information use (Major, 1980). It should 
therefore not come as a surprise that different measures yield inconsistent results. Yet, 
we submit that the inconsistency is also, and perhaps mainly, due to a neglect of the 
extent to which the conversational context of the experimental communication about 
stimulus events and attribution questions affect participants’ actual use of covariation 
information towards explaining interpersonal events.  
Testing the covariation model: A Gricean view 
Previous research has often treated the verbally described to-be-explained events 
and the attribution questions that participants are presented with in attribution studies as 
occurring within a social vacuum. To fully understand attribution processes occurring in 
the context of verbally communicated events, however, it is advisable to view the 
experimental communication within its broader conversational context. In this section, 
we explain the predictions that a Gricean analysis inspires about how people use 
different types of covariation information in causal judgments.  
Before continuing, it is important to note that while trying to explain interpersonal 
events people above all wish to know which interactant is most responsible for the 
event. Consensus and distinctiveness differentiate between actor and patient attributions 
whereas consistency does not. Hence, to test predictions of the covariation model as it 
applies to interpersonal events it is most useful to examine effects of consensus and 
distinctiveness. Our application of a Gricean analysis to covariation-based attribution 
therefore focuses on the use of distinctiveness and consensus information. 
Grice (1975)’s analysis states that conversations are governed by the assumption 
that communication partners follow a principle of cooperation, which makes them 
follow a set of basic rules (‘maxims’). One is the ‘maxim of relation’, which implies 
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that any message should be relevant for the goals of the conversation. This maxim 
implies that communications about an actor doing something to a patient suggest that 
this information is worth sharing. Previous research has shown that Grice (1975)’s 
analysis of human conversations applies to the communication between experimenters 
and participants as well as to everyday conversations (e.g. Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & 
Naderer, 1991; Strack, Schwarz, & Wänke, 1991). Hence, it probably also holds for 
participants reading stimulus materials in experiments on causal attribution.  
In the case of actor-verb-patient messages, the maxim of relation implies that it is 
noteworthy that this actor did so to this patient (cf. the rarity principle in conditional 
reasoning, Oaksford & Chater, 1994; and the greater information contained in rare than 
in common ones, McKenzie, Ferreira, Mikkelsen, McDermott, & Skrable, 2001; 
McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2007). If Peter kissed everyone, there would be no need to 
specify that it was Mary he kissed. If everyone kissed Mary, there would be no need to 
specify that it was Peter who did so. And if everyone kissed everyone, the message that 
Peter kissed Mary would be completely meaningless.  
In covariation terms, the maxim of relation makes observers spontaneously expect 
that consensus is low and that distinctiveness is high. Upon encountering explicitly 
provided contextual information about interpersonal events, they approach the 
information with these a priori conversation-based expectations in mind (cf. also Hilton, 
1995). By consequence, their use of such information towards forming a causal 
judgment can be described through an attribution question hypothesis, an 
interdependence hypothesis, and an asymmetry hypothesis. 
The attribution question hypothesis 
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When people are asked to which extent an actor caused an interpersonal event, Gricean 
logic dictates that they infer that it is reasonable to assume that the actor contributed to 
the event. If this were totally implausible, the question would be irrelevant. Similarly, 
when asked to which extent a patient caused an interpersonal event, Gricean logic 
dictates that people infer that it is reasonable to assume that the patient contributed to 
the event. The innuendo effect, implying that media questions make the audience 
believe that the answers to them must be affirmative, is an illustration of this principle 
(Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, Beattie, 1981). 
When answering questions about actor causation, therefore, participants test the 
hypothesis that the actor did play a role. When answering questions about patient 
causation, they test the hypothesis that the patient played a role. Importantly, people test 
hypotheses in a confirmatory manner (Greenwald, 2012; Hansen, 1980; Nickerson, 
1998). Confirming the actor hypothesis requires finding low consensus and low 
distinctiveness. Already assuming that consensus must be low (as the communicator 
bothered talking or writing about the event), people focus on distinctiveness. 
Confirming the patient hypothesis requires finding high consensus and high 
distinctiveness. Assuming that distinctiveness must be high, people focus on consensus. 
A Gricean analysis therefore predicts that distinctiveness information affects actor 
rather than patient attributions and that consensus information affects patient rather than 
actor attributions. 
In fact, there is an additional reason to doubt such a pattern. The contingency 
judgment literature reveals that people weight in which an object whose frequency or 
causal role is being judged is present cases more heavily than cases in which it is absent 
(White, 2002, 2003a,b). When wondering about the role of an actor, observers may scan 
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the covariation information for elements mentioning this actor – which is distinctiveness 
information. When wondering about the role of the patient, they may scan the 
covariation information for elements mentioning the patient – which is consensus 
information.  
 In contrast, the model presents causal attribution as a purely inductive process. 
People are assumed to collect consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information 
without a specific a priori hypothesis guiding their information search and use and 
hence in a non-directional and rather detached fashion, assess the relevant covariation 
with the to-be-explained event, and thus decide upon a causal factor (see Hansen, 1980; 
Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham, & Jaspars, 1984, for previous criticisms of this aspect of the 
model). 
Research that pits the attribution question hypothesis against the assumption of the 
covariation model against its other is surprisingly scarce. Researchers have 
acknowledged and examined the potentially differential role of consensus and 
distinctiveness. Some results seem to dovetail with predictions from the attribution 
questions hypothesis, with people above all seeking distinctiveness information while 
assessing the actor’s role and above all seeking consensus information while assessing 
the patient’s causal role (e.g. Alicke & Insko, 1984; Bassili & Regan, 1977; Garland, 
Hardy, & Stephenson, 1975; Hansen, 1980, Study 3; Hortacsu, 1987, 1990; Major, 
1980, Study 1; Pandelaere, Hoorens & Peeters, 2003). In one study, participants judged 
their confidence in actor and patient attributions after having received distinctiveness or 
consensus information. Distinctiveness rather than consensus affected self-reported 
confidence in actor attributions, with no difference in self-reported confidence in patient 
attributions (Hansen, 1980, Experiment 4). Still, other results contradict the predications 
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from the attribution question hypothesis. For instance, Hilton, Smith, and Alicke (1988, 
Study 1-4) observed that people above all wished to receive consensus information to 
answer a attribution question about the actor of an achievement-related event. Yet, all 
these studies have focused on the extent to which people seek or say that they value 
various types of covariation information rather than people’s actual effect of these types 
of information on causal judgments. As such they may be relevant about information 
research preferences but remain silent about actual information use. 
The few studies that did test the actual relative use of consensus and distinctiveness 
information in actor and patient judgments yielded ambiguous results. Besides having 
participants request as much covariation information as they wished, Major (1980) had 
participants pass actual causal judgments. In the first experiment (involving an 
interpersonal event), consensus and distinctiveness affected causal judgments about the 
actor and the patient. In the second experiment (with a nonsocial event), distinctiveness 
but not consensus affected both actor and patient judgments. In another study examining 
the effect of distinctiveness and consensus information on answers to attribution 
questions about mostly nonsocial events (Hansen, 1980, Study 5), distinctiveness 
seemed to affect causal judgments about the actor (‘person’ in Hansen, 1980) more than 
consensus did and consensus seemed to affect causal judgments about the patient 
(‘entity’ in Hansen, 1980) more than distinctiveness did. This is the pattern that the 
attribution question hypothesis would predict. Unfortunately, neither Major nor Hansen 
reported statistical tests of the high-low difference being relatively large for 
distinctiveness effects on actor judgments (as compared to patient judgments) and for 
consensus effects on patient judgments (as compared to actor judgments).  
The interdependence hypothesis 
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If a question about actor causation provokes the hypothesis that an actor has caused an 
event and hence makes observers expect low consensus and low distinctiveness, as a 
Gricean analysis implies, then high consensus and high distinctiveness contradict their 
expectations. If a question about patient causation provokes the hypothesis that the 
patient has caused the event and thus makes observers expect high consensus and high 
distinctiveness, as the Gricean analysis also implies, then low consensus and low 
distinctiveness contradict their expectations. Upon encountering unexpected 
information, observers arguably process the remaining available information more 
attentively. Thus, consensus and distinctiveness primarily affect actor judgments if 
distinctiveness and consensus are high, respectively, whereas consensus and 
distinctiveness primarily affect patient judgments if distinctiveness and consensus are 
low, respectively.  
 We thus formulated an interdependence hypothesis stating that both consensus 
and distinctiveness primarily affect actor judgments if the alternative dimension is high 
and primarily affect patient judgments if the alternative dimension is low. In the 
introductory example, observers wishing to assess Peter’s causal role in the kissing 
event may attach more weight to information about how many other people Peter kissed 
if they learn that many others also kissed Mary than if they learn that only a few people 
also kissed Mary. Observers wishing to assess Mary’s causal role may weigh 
information about the number of others who also kissed her more heavily if they learn 
that Peter kissed many other people than if they learn that Peter kissed few people. 
The interdependence hypothesis differs from the idea, implied by the covariation 
model, that consensus and distinctiveness jointly affect causal judgments but that while 
they do so consensus affects causal judgments to similar extents over the whole range of 
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the distinctiveness dimension and that distinctiveness affects causal judgments to 
similar extents over the whole range of the consensus dimension. The element of joint 
determination has previously been described as a consensus and distinctiveness 
‘interaction’ (e.g. Hansen, 1980, Study 5). Yet it merely refers to the idea that the two 
types of information jointly affect causal judgments. For instance, knowing that Peter 
kissed few people and that many others kissed Mary jointly suggest that something 
about Mary makes people want to kiss her. This ‘interaction’ does not refer to a 
potentially differential weighting of one type of information under the influence of the 
other type of information or, stated differently, to observers’ use of one dimension being 
a function of the information they get on the alternative dimension.  
To the best of our knowledge, the interdependence hypothesis has not been tested 
before. Yet, it does have some empirical basis. It has become a truism among perception 
and social cognition psychologists that context variables affect the perception and 
evaluation of stimuli. To name one example, observers’ interpretation of characteristics 
attributed to an individual depends on the information they have available about the 
individual’s other characteristics (for an overview, see Aronson, 2012). We therefore 
found it worthwhile to examine whether a similar interdependence also characterizes 
people’s use of consensus and distinctiveness information in causal judgments. 
The Asymmetry hypothesis 
If verbal descriptions of interpersonal events make people assume low consensus and 
high distinctiveness, as a Gricean analysis implies, then explicitly provided covariation 
information about low consensus or high distinctiveness contributes little new 
information. Hence, it will not strongly affect causal judgments. In contrast, information 
about consensus being high or distinctiveness being low goes beyond (and contradicts) 
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what the observers already know. Hence, it will affect their judgments. We thus 
formulated an asymmetry hypothesis stating that high consensus and low distinctiveness 
affect causal judgments more than low consensus and high distinctiveness do. 
 One might object that people also apply the maxim of quantity on the 
covariation information, and hence always assumes that is informative. Yet participants 
do not view the covariation information in the same manner as the behavioral 
descriptions themselves. They view the descriptions as the to-be-explained events and 
the covariation information as additional information that may or may not be useful 
towards the explanation task. They thus view the latter as information whose relevance 
they need to assess as part of the experimental task (cf. Hilton & Slugoski, 1986). 
 The asymmetry hypothesis is obviously at odds with the idea implied by the 
presentation of the covariation model as a perfect cube, namely, that each position on 
each dimension is equally informative about the causation going on. For instance, 
knowing that many people kiss Mary is, according to the model, as informative as 
knowing that few people kiss Mary – but it in different directions. In contrast, the 
asymmetry hypothesis states that the former message, including more unexpected 
information, tells more than the latter. 
One study may, at first sight, seem at odds with the asymmetry hypothesis. Hilton 
and Slugoski (1986, Study 1) had participants judge how much information they felt 
various constellations of covariation conveyed about the actor, the patient (in their 
terminology: the stimulus), and the circumstances. When the behaviors were not 
strongly norm-dictated or norm-deviating, participants reported that low consensus was 
more informative about the actor than high consensus and that high distinctiveness was 
more informative about the patient than low distinctiveness. This pattern is exactly the 
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opposite of what the asymmetry hypothesis states. Yet, Hilton and Slugovki examined 
evaluative judgments about the covariation information rather than the effect of this 
information on causal judgments. Assuming that processes guiding the judgment of data 
are not necessarily identical to those guiding actual causal judgments, it becomes clear 
that the assumption of symmetry in actual causal judgments has basically gone untested. 
Published studies typically included high versus low consensus and high versus low 
distinctiveness without control conditions without covariation information. In a rare 
exception Hansen (1980, Study 5) compared causal judgments under low and high 
consensus and distinctiveness as compared to the situation in which the relevant 
covariation information was absent. As the covariation model predicts, he found 
opposing effects of low and high consensus and distinctiveness. Yet, he did not test 
whether they affected causal judgments to similar extents.  
The Present Research 
The covariation model is widely recognized as a landmark theory in causal 
attribution (cf. Weiner, 2008). Many theories of causal judgments extended, articulated, 
complemented, or built upon it (e.g, Bowler, Woehr, Bowler, Wuensch, & McIntyre, 
2011; Cheng, 1997; Eberly, Halley, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2011; Green & Mitchell, 
1979; Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; Martinko & Thomson, 1997; Sutton & McClure, 
2001; Van Overwalle, 1997, 2003; White, 2002, 2003a,b). There is even a recently 
increased interest in the model, both in applied psychological disciplines (e.g., Harris & 
Fiske, 2008; Klein, Apple, & Kahn, 2011; Quayle & Naidoo, 2012; Samnami, Singh, & 
Ezzedeen, 2013; Schwarz, 2012; Schimansky, Rössler, & Haker 2012; Seiver, Gopnik, 
& Goodman, 2013) and in fields outside of psychology (e.g., Coombs, 2007; Jiang, 
Gretzel, & Law, 2010; Koonce, Seybert, & Smith, 2011; McClure, Allen, & Wolkey, 
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2001; Ployhart, Ehrhart, & Hayes, 2005; Rees, Ingledew, & Hardy, 2005; Ryan & 
Boscia, 2003; Schwarz, 2008). All these recent developments make it timely to examine 
its underlying assumptions.  Inspired by a Gricean analysis, we tested an attribution 
question hypothesis, an interdependence hypothesis, and an asymmetry hypothesis for 
causal judgments about actors and patients of verbally described interpersonal events.  
Besides its Gricean approach, our research is characterized by its focus on 
interpersonal events. Failing to distinguish between social and nonsocial events, most 
previous tests of aspects of the covariation model have mostly used nonsocial ones. Yet, 
people are likely to approach attribution tasks depending on the social nature of the to-
be-explained events. First, patients of interpersonal events have a will of their own and 
hence may be suspected of intentionally provoking the actors’ behaviors. Second, 
people are mostly interested in other individuals’ interpersonal behaviors. Knowing how 
another individual treats fellow human beings and how others treat the individual 
informs the observer about how he or she is likely to be treated. Supporting this 
reasoning, person judgments on the dimension of warmth (rather than competence) 
dominate person perception (e.g. Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Wojciszke & Abele, 
2008).  
Only two projects have compared causal attributions for nonsocial and interpersonal 
events. McArthur (1976) examined attributions for events of which the actor and the 
patient were persons or inanimate objects. She found no effects of the patient being a 
person or an object. Yet, an inspection of her stimuli reveals that the meaning of the 
verbs covaried with the person-object variables. Orvis, Cunningham, and Kelley (1975) 
examined how people filled in incomplete covariation information or chose between 
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causal candidates. Their participants more often inferred low distinctiveness, high 
consensus, and high consistency for achievements than for interpersonal events.  
Two additional sets of studies yielded relevant results. Major (1980) presented 
participants with a vignette about an interpersonal event (a fight, Experiment 1) or a 
nonsocial event (an employee working on a project, Experiment 2). Before passing 
causal judgments, participants could request covariation information. Participants in the 
first experiment requested more distinctiveness than consensus information whereas 
participants in the second experiment requested equal amounts of both. Hansen (1980, 
Experiment 1) had participants generate causal hypotheses about achievements, 
emotions, and therapeutic outcomes. The latter category, the sole that exclusively 
consisted of interpersonal events, provoked hypotheses about actors and patients (clients 
and therapists) whereas the former two categories mainly provoked hypotheses about 
either actors or ‘patients’, respectively. Moreover, therapeutic outcomes were more 
often attributed to both the actor and the patient. For all these reasons, we submit that it 
is worth the effort to specifically study the assumptions of the covariation model as it 
applies to interpersonal events.  
Now that the general context of our research is set, it is time to present the blueprint 
of our studies. All three studies tested the attribution question hypothesis and the 
interdependence hypothesis. Study 2 and Study 3 also tested the asymmetry hypothesis. 
Participants always read actor-verb-patient descriptions of interpersonal events. In 
Study 1, the actor-verb-patient descriptions went accompanied by high versus low 
consensus and distinctiveness information. Study 2 and Study 3 included control 
conditions without covariation information. In Study 3 we also manipulated consistency 
information (low, high, absent). As we were interested in how consensus and 
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distinctiveness affected actual causal judgments, rather than in judgments about how 
informative people considered consensus and distinctiveness and how interested they 
were in obtaining the information, we had participant indicated how much the actor had 
contributed to the event and how much the patient had contributed to the event. These 
questions were modeled after those used by Hansen (1980, Experiment 2).  
We used rating scales instead of forced-choice questions for three different reasons. 
First and foremost, testing our hypotheses necessitated that we examined actor and 
patient attributions separately. Second, forced-choice measures rest upon the 
assumption that attributions are inversely related, with increasing attributions to one 
causal agent necessitating the role of another agent being discounted – an assumption 
that has not received consistent empirical support (Hansen, 1980; Miller, Smith, & 
Uleman, 1981; Solomon, 1978). Forced- choice studies typically allow participants to 
choose between an attribution to the actor, the patient, the situation, and the actor-
patient interaction (sometimes also including various other interactions). We had 
participants judge the causal role of the actor and the patient only. Besides being 
tedious, having to answer four or more questions per stimulus description would 
probably have made participants weary about us being interested in the internal logic of 
their answers. Moreover, our approach did not prohibit situational or interactional 
causation to become evident. To show that they viewed the actor-patient combination as 
the main causal agent, for instance, participants could give high ratings for both the 
actor and the patient.  To show that neither the actor nor the patient was the main causal 
agent, they could give low ratings for both.  
Study 1 
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The attribution question hypothesis predicted that participants would predominantly 
use distinctiveness information to pass causal judgments on the actor and use consensus 
information to pass causal judgments on the patient. The interdependence hypothesis 
predicted that participants’ use of consensus and distinctiveness should depend on the 
information about the alternative dimension.  
Method 
Participants. Eighty first-year psychology students (65 women, Mage = 18.3 years, 
age range: 17-26 years) participated to partially fulfill course requirements.  
Materials. Each participant received a questionnaire with all instructions and 
stimulus materials. The instructions read that the study was about how people interpret 
interpersonal events when they possess limited information. Participants would 
therefore read actor-verb-patient descriptions along with some context information, and 
answer questions about them. The instructions acknowledged that the task might be 
difficult yet encouraged participants to not skip any questions. 
Participants then saw the actor-verb-patient descriptions. Each description went 
accompanied by information indicating high versus low consensus and distinctiveness. 
We thus created four covariation combinations. For instance, one item might read: 
Ann hits Bart. 
Ann hits almost everyone. 
Almost everyone hits Bart. 
 
The actors and the patients were indicated by common first names, with different 
names for each description. To ensure generality, half of the events were desirable and 
the other half were undesirable. Moreover, the descriptions included equal numbers of 
descriptive action verbs (e.g. embrace, kick), interpretative action verbs (e.g. help, 
provoke), and state verbs (e.g. trust, fear) to control for implicit consensus and 
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distinctiveness information participants might derive from different verb types (cf. 
Hoorens, Maier, & Maris, 2012; Rudolph & Försterling, 1997; Rudolph & von Hecker, 
2006; Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Two questions appeared under each stimulus sentence: 
‘To what extent was the event caused by the actor?’, and ‘To what extent was the event 
caused by the patient?’ Participants answered using 9-point scales (1 = not at all and 9 = 
entirely). 
Procedure and design. We ran the experiment during two mass testing sessions. 
Each participant received a questionnaire that they filled out in their own pace. 
The combination of a high versus low level on two dimensions of covariation 
information with two attribution questions resulted in a 2 (Consensus: low vs. high) x 2 
(Distinctiveness: low vs. high) x 2 (Target: actor vs. patient) within-subjects design. 
Each condition was represented by 18 verbs (3 positive and 3 negative instances of 3 
verb types) taken from Hoorens et al. (2012). Each participant thus responded to 72 
items (18 descriptions x 4 consensus-distinctiveness combinations).  
The verbs appeared in a fixed random order with the restriction that each verb 
occurred once before any given verb occurred again. We counterbalanced the order of 
consensus and distinctiveness, the order of the questions, and the description’s gender 
composition (with half of the participants reading about female actors and male patients 
and the other half reading about male actors and female patients).  
Results and discussion  
If participants inadvertently treated the questions as complementary, assuming that 
actor and patient ratings should be inversely related, then the two scales would boil 
down to a single bipolar scale and the two items would be very strongly negatively 
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correlated. Instead, we observed a modest positive correlation between mean actor 
ratings and mean patient ratings (r = 0.29, df = 78; p = .009). 
Thus reassured we calculated average causal judgments per Consensus x 
Distinctiveness x Target combination. We subjected these to an ANOVA with 
consensus, distinctiveness, and target as within-subject variables. The main effects of 
consensus, F(1,79) = 60.0, p < .001, η² = .432 , distinctiveness, F(1,79) = 9.4, p = .003, 
η² = .107, and target, F(1,79) = 48.9, p < .001, η² = .382, were significant. All three 
factors were involved in interactions that will be discussed below. The cell means of 
this and the following studies are presented in Table 1. 
------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
The attribution question hypothesis. The attribution question hypothesis states 
that actor judgments predominantly depend on distinctiveness whereas patient 
judgments predominantly depend on consensus. The predicted two-way interactions 
were significant: target by consensus, F(1,79) = 127.2, p <.001, η² = .617, and target by 
distinctiveness, F(1,79) = 133.8, p <.001, η² = .629. To follow up on them we calculated 
low-high consensus and low-high distinctiveness difference scores. As expected, 
consensus differences were larger for patient judgments (M = 1.6, SD = 1.3) than for 
actor judgments (M = 0.6, SD = 0.8), t(79) = 7.7, p < .001, and distinctiveness 
differences were larger for actor judgments (M = 1.4, SD = 1.4) than for patient 
judgments (M = 0.9, SD = 0.8), t(79) = 3.1, p = .003. Another way to look at the 
interaction is by saying that for actor judgments distinctiveness differences exceeded (M 
= 1.4, SD = 1.4) consensus differences (M = 0.6, SD = 0.8), t(79) = 6.4, p < .001, 
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whereas for patient judgments consensus differences exceeded (M = 1.6, SD = 1.3) 
distinctiveness differences (M = 0.9, SD = 0.8), t(79) = 5.2, p < .001.  
Our findings thus supported the attribution question hypothesis. Extending the 
findings of Hansen (1980, Study 5), they demonstrated the predicted unequal use of 
consensus and distinctiveness information to answer attribution questions about the 
actor and the patient of interpersonal events.  
The interdependence hypothesis. The interdependence hypothesis predicted that 
consensus and distinctiveness would particularly affect causal judgments about the actor 
if the alternative dimension was high and particularly affect causal judgments about the 
patient if the alternative dimension was low.  
The predicted two-way interaction of consensus and distinctiveness and three-way 
interaction of target, consensus, and distinctiveness were significant, F(1,79) = 35.8, p < 
.001, η² = .312, and F(1,79) = 11.1, p = .001, η² = .123, respectively. To understand 
these interactions we calculated low-high difference scores reflecting how much a given 
dimension affected causal judgments (see Figure 1). For actor judgments, the low-high 
differences were larger if the alternative dimension was high than if the alternative 
dimension was low; t’s(79) = -3.9, p < .001. For patient judgments, the low-high 
differences were larger if the alternative dimension was low than if the alternative 
dimension was high; t’s(79) = 6.1, p < .001. Study 1 thus supported the interdependence 
hypothesis.  
------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------- 
Study 2 
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Study 2 aimed at replicating the findings of Study 1 while testing the asymmetry 
hypothesis.  
Method 
Participants. First year students participated to fulfill a course requirement (108 
women Mage = 18 years, age range: 17-21 years). 
Materials, procedure, and design. Study 2 was identical to Study 1 except for the 
following. First, consensus and distinctiveness were either high, low, or absent. Second, 
we compensated the increased number of combinations by counterbalancing verb 
category over participants. Each participant thus responded to 54 items (6 descriptions 
with 9 consensus-distinctiveness combinations) representing 3 (Consensus: low vs. high 
vs. none) x 3 (Distinctiveness: low vs. high vs. none) x 2 (Target: actor vs. patient) 
within-subjects conditions.  
Results and discussion 
There was a significant but low negative correlation between the actor and the 
patient ratings (r = -0.19, df = 111; p = .044). We therefore treated the causal judgments 
as in Study 1. The ANOVA with target, consensus, and distinctiveness as within-subject 
variables yielded main effects of target, F(1,112) = 67.29, p < .001, η² = .38, and 
consensus, F(2,224) = 30.22, p < .001, η² = .21. Both factors were involved in the 
interactions discussed below.  
The attribution question hypothesis. Participants used consensus information 
more to assess the causal role of the patient than to assess the causal role of the actor. 
The interaction of target by consensus was significant, F(2,224) = 281.53, p < .001, η² = 
.72. The high-low consensus difference was larger for patient judgments (|Mdiff| = 2.42, 
SD = 1.67) than for actor judgments (|Mdiff| = 1.55, SD = 1.04), t(112) = 6.1, p < .001.  
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Yet, participants did not use distinctiveness information more to assess the causal 
role of the actor than to assess the causal role of the patient. The interaction of target by 
distinctiveness was significant, F(2,224) = 229.54, p < .001, η² = .67, yet the high-low 
distinctiveness difference was not larger for actor judgments (|Mdiff| = 1.59, SD = 1.58) 
than for patient judgments (|Mdiff| = 1.80, SD = 0.97), t(112) = 1.5, p = .147.  
Study 2 thus yielded partial support for the attribution question hypothesis. As in 
Study 1, the attribution question affected the use of consensus information. Contrary to 
Study 1, we found no evidence of the attribution question affecting the use of 
distinctiveness information.  
The interdependence hypothesis. As in Study 1, a two-way interaction of 
consensus by distinctiveness, F(4,448) = 52.73, p < .001, η² = .32, was qualified by a 
predicted three-way with target, F(4,448) = 88.53, p < .001, η² = .44. For actor 
judgments, the low-high differences were larger if the alternative dimension was high 
than if the alternative dimension was low; t’s(112) = 4.9, p < .001. For patient 
judgments, the low-high differences were larger of the alternative dimension was low 
than if the alternative dimension was high; t’s(112) = 5.9, p < .001. Consensus affected 
judgments most in the absence of distinctiveness (actor: |Mdiff| = 2.59, SD = 1.63; 
patient: |Mdiff| = 2.89, SD = 1.85), and distinctiveness affected judgments most in the 
absence of consensus (actor: |Mdiff| = 2.08, SD = 1.82; patient: |Mdiff| = 3.35, SD = 1.85).  
The interdependence hypothesis was thus fully supported. Consensus and 
distinctiveness primarily affected causal judgments about the actor if the alternative 
dimension was high and primarily affected causal judgments about the patient if the 
alternative dimension was low. Both consensus and distinctiveness affected causal 
judgments most of all in the absence of information about the alternative dimension.  
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The asymmetry hypothesis. We tested the prediction that high consensus and low 
distinctiveness would affect causal judgments more than low consensus and high 
distinctiveness would. As compared to the no-consensus-condition low consensus 
enhanced actor judgments (Mdiff = 0.58, SD = .75), t(112) = 8.25, p < .001, and reduced 
patient judgments (Mdiff = -0.76, SD = 1.05), t(112) = 7.68, p < .001, whereas high 
consensus reduced actor judgments (Mdiff = -0.97, SD = .80), t(112) = 12.87, p < .001, 
and enhanced patient judgments (Mdiff = 1.66, SD = 1.05), t(112) = 16.85, p < .001. 
Similarly, as compared to the no-distinctiveness-condition low distinctiveness enhanced 
actor judgments (Mdiff = 0.96, SD = 1.11), t(112) = 9.17, p < .001, and reduced patient 
judgments (Mdiff = -1.03, SD = 0.74), t(112) = 14.91, p < .001, whereas high 
distinctiveness reduced actor judgments (Mdiff = -0.63, SD = 0.86), t(112) = 7.77, p < 
.001, and enhanced patient judgments (Mdiff = 0.76, SD = 0.66), t(112) = 12.39, p < .001. 
Consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis, a comparison of the low-no consensus and 
high-no consensus differences revealed that it was particularly high consensus that 
affected actor judgments, t(112) = 3.6, p = .001, and patient judgments, t(112) = 7.6, p < 
.001. A comparison of the low-no distinctiveness and high-no distinctiveness 
differences revealed that it was particularly low distinctiveness that affected actor 
judgments, t(112) = 2.9, p = .005, and patient judgments, t(112) = 2.8, p = .005. Study 2 
thus supported the asymmetry hypothesis.  
Study 3 
Study 3 tested the attribution question hypothesis, the interdependence hypothesis, 
and the asymmetry hypothesis in a design that also included a consistency manipulation. 
It thus allowed testing the generality of the findings in Study 1 and Study 2.  
Method 
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Participants. First year students participated to fulfill a course requirement (55 
women Mage = 19 years, age range: 17-22 years). 
Materials, procedure, and design. Study 3 was identical to Study 2 except for the 
following. First, consistency was high, low, or absent. Second, as verb category did not 
markedly influence causal attributions in the previous studies each participant received 
descriptions with interpretative action verbs. Third, to compensate the increased number 
of covariation patterns we counterbalanced valence over actors. Each participant thus 
responded to 81 items (3 descriptions with 27 consistency-consensus-distinctiveness 
combinations each) representing 3 (Consistency: low vs. high vs. none) x 3 (Consensus: 
low vs. high vs. none) x 3 (Distinctiveness: low vs. high vs. none) x 2 (Target: actor vs. 
patient) within-subjects conditions.  
Results and Discussion 
The actor and the patient ratings were significantly negatively correlated (r = -0.53, df = 
68; p = .001). We postpone a discussion of this correlation until the General Discussion. 
As it still fell short of the correlation one would expect if the subject and object ratings 
tapped into the same construct we decided to treated the results as in the previous 
studies. 
Study 3 mainly examined whether the effects that we observed in Study 1 and Study 
2 also emerged if we varied consistency information. Consistency does not differentiate 
between actor and patient attributions, so we were interested in replicating the effects of 
Study 1 and Study 2 rather than in analyzing consistency effects. We therefore start by 
describing the results as they pertain to our hypotheses and describe consistency effects 
towards the end. 
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The ANOVA with target, consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness as within-
subject variables yielded main effects of target, F(1,69) = 83.23, p < .001, η² = .55, 
consistency, F(2,138) = 12.19, p < .001, η² = .15, consensus, F(2,138) = 11.9, p < .001, 
η² = .15, and distinctiveness, F(2,138) = 3.16, p = .05, η² = .04. All these factors were 
involved in higher order interactions explained below.  
The attribution question hypothesis. Participants used consensus information 
more to assess the causal role of the patient than to assess the causal role of the actor. 
The interaction of target by consensus was significant, F(2,138) = 46.3, p < .001, η² = 
.40, with the high-low consensus difference being larger for patient judgments (|Mdiff| = 
1.15, SD = 1.6) than for actor judgments (|Mdiff| = .60, SD = .8), t(69) = 3.5, p = .001. In 
contrast, participants did not use distinctiveness information more to assess the causal 
role of the actor than to assess the causal role of the patient. The interaction of target by 
distinctiveness was significant, F(2,138) = 38.4, p < .001, η² = .36, yet the high-low 
distinctiveness difference was not larger for actor judgments (|Mdiff| = .62, SD = 1.3) 
than for patient judgments (|Mdiff| = .87, SD = 0.8), t(69) = 1.8, p = .081. Study 3 thus 
yielded partial support for the attribution question hypothesis.   
The interdependence hypothesis. The two-way interaction of consensus by 
distinctiveness, F(4,276) = 8.5, p < .001, η² = .11, was again qualified by a three-way 
with target, F(4,276) = 14.6, p < .001, η² = .18.  
Consensus affected actor judgments more if distinctiveness information was absent 
(|Mdiff| = .95, SD = 1.2) than if distinctiveness was low (|Mdiff| = 0.41, SD = 1.0) or high 
(|Mdiff| = 0.44, SD = .9), t(69) = 3.6, p = .001, and t(69) = 3.8, p < .001, respectively. The 
latter conditions did not differ, t(69) = -.2, p = .848. Neither did the effect of 
distinctiveness on actor judgments depend on consensus (high:|Mdiff| = .57, SD = 1.5; 
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low:|Mdiff| = .75, SD = 1.5; absent:|Mdiff| = .55, SD = 1.4), all t’s(69) < 1.6, all p’s > .115. 
Consensus affected patient judgments more if distinctiveness information was absent 
(|Mdiff| = 1.48, SD = 1.6) or if distinctiveness was low (|Mdiff| = 1.31, SD = 1.9) than if it 
was high (|Mdiff| = .66, SD = 1.7), t(69) = 5.2, p < .001, and, t(69) = 4.6, p < .001, 
respectively. The former conditions did not differ, t(69) = 1.2, p = .223. Distinctiveness 
affected patient judgments more if consensus information was absent (|Mdiff| = 1.35, SD 
= 1.5) than if it was low (|Mdiff| = .95, SD = 1.0), t(69) = 2.9, p = .004, and more if 
consensus was low than if it was high (|Mdiff| = .31, SD = .78), t(69) = 4.6, p < .001. 
Study 3 thus yielded partial support for the interdependence hypothesis. Consensus 
and distinctiveness affected patient judgments more if the alternative dimension was 
low than if it was high. Yet, they did not affect actor judgments more if the alternative 
dimension was high than if it was low.  
The asymmetry hypothesis. Low consensus enhanced actor judgments (Mdiff = 
0.13, SD = .4), t(69) = 2.71, p = .009, and reduced patient judgments (Mdiff = -0.20, SD = 
.7), t(69) = 2.29, p = .025, whereas high consensus reduced actor judgments (Mdiff = -
0.47, SD = .7), t(69) = 6.01, p < .001, and enhanced patient judgments (Mdiff = .96, SD = 
1.2), t(69) = 6.90, p < .001. Low distinctiveness enhanced actor judgments (Mdiff = 0.48, 
SD = .9), t(69) = 4.67, p < .001, and reduced patient judgments (Mdiff = -.53, SD = 0.6), 
t(69) = 7.63, p < .001, whereas high distinctiveness marginally reduced actor judgments 
(Mdiff = -0.14, SD = 0.7), t(69) = 1.76, p = .083, and enhanced patient judgments (Mdiff = 
0.34, SD = 0.5), t(69) = 5.56, p < .001. Consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis, 
however, participants used high consensus information more than low consensus 
information, both in actor judgments, t(69) = 3.7, p < .001, and in patient judgments, 
t(69) = 5.8, p < .001. Similarly, they used low distinctiveness information more than 
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they used high distinctiveness information, both in actor judgments, t(69) = 3.7, p < 
.001, and in patient judgments, t(69) = 2.2, p = .031. Study 3 thus uniformly supported 
the asymmetry hypothesis.  
The influence of consistency. As we were not primarily interested in effects 
involving consistency, we merely include them for completeness’ sake.  
There was an interaction of target by consistency, F(2,138) = 8.3, p < .001, η² = .11. 
High consistency enhanced actor judgments (Mdif = .13, SD = .4), t(69) = 2.86, p = .006, 
and low consistency reduced them (Mdif = -.27, SD = .6), t(69) = 3.88, p < .001. 
Consistency did not influence patient judgments (high: Mdif = .06, SD = .4, t(69) = 1.25, 
p = .216; low: Mdif = .10, SD = .5, t(69) = 1.57, p = .120).  
The interaction of consistency by consensus, distinctiveness, and target was 
significant, F(8,552) = 4.9, p < .001, η² = .07. Interactions of consistency by consensus, 
F(4,276) = 3.5, p = .008, η² = .05, and of consistency by distinctiveness, F(4,276) = 3.4, 
p < .001, η² = .07, were each qualified by a higher order interaction with target, 
F(4,276) = 11.1, p < .001, η² = .14 and F(4,276) = 3.7, p = .006, η² = .05, respectively.  
Consistency influenced the use of low but not of high consensus. Participants used 
low consensus for actor judgments if consistency was absent (Mdiff = .21, SD = .53), 
t(69) = 3.24, p = .002, but not if it was present (high consistency: Mdiff = .12, SD = .59, 
t(69) = 1.77, p = .082; low consistency: Mdiff = .06, SD = .73, t(69) = .64, p = .523). 
They used low consensus for patient judgments if consistency was low (Mdiff = -.32, SD 
= .95), t(69) = 2.81, p = .006, but not if it was high (Mdiff = -.23, SD = .79), t(69) = 2.43, 
p = .018, or absent (Mdiff = -.04, SD = .91), t(69) = .39, p = .696. The use of high 
consensus did not depend on consistency for actor judgments (low: Mdiff = -.25, SD = 
.87; high: Mdiff = -.50, SD = .58; absent: Mdiff = -.67, SD = .97), all t’s (69) > 2.39, p’s < 
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.020, or patient judgments (low: Mdiff = .61, SD = 1.33; high: Mdiff = 1.03, SD = 1.21; 
absent: Mdiff = 1.22, SD = 1.27), all t’s (69) > 3.85, p’s < .001. 
Consistency influenced the use of high but not of low distinctiveness. Participants 
failed to use high distinctiveness for actor judgments if consistency was low or absent 
(low: Mdiff  = -.05, SD = .70; absent: Mdiff = -.17, SD = 1.00), all t’s(69) < 1.38, p’s > 
.170, but did use it if consistency was high (Mdiff = -.21, SD = .86), t(69) = 2.02, p = 
.047. Participants also used high distinctiveness for patient judgments if consistency 
was high or absent (high: Mdiff  = .32, SD = .89; absent: Mdiff = .55, SD = .78), all t’s(69) 
< 3.02, p’s < .004, but not if it was low (Mdiff = .16, SD = .75), t(69) < 1.83, p = .072. 
Consistency did not affect the use of low distinctiveness, either for actor judgments 
(low: Mdiff = .54, SD = 1.12; high: Mdiff  = .36, SD = .84; absent: Mdiff = .53, SD = 1.08), 
all t’s(69) > 3.63, p’s < .001, or for patient judgments (low: Mdiff  = -.40, SD = .87; high: 
Mdiff  = -.55, SD = .804; absent: Mdiff = -.64, SD = .84), all t’s(69) > 3.80, p’s < .001.  
General Discussion 
Based on a Gricean analysis, we challenged three basic assumptions of the 
covariation model as it applies to causal attributions for verbally described interpersonal 
events. We found that the assumptions of invariant, independent, and symmetrical use 
of consensus and distinctiveness information did not generally hold, at least not in this 
specific attribution case. 
The attribution question hypothesis, saying that people particularly use 
distinctiveness information to judge the causal role of the actor and consensus 
information to judge the causal role of the patient, received partial support. Participants 
consistently weighted consensus heavier while judging the patient’s role than while 
judging the actor’s role (Study 1, 2 & 3). In one study (Study 1), but not in the two other 
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studies, they also weighted distinctiveness heavier while judging the actor’s role than 
while judging the patient’s role.  
The interdependence hypothesis, saying that the use of a given covariation 
dimension critically depends on the alternative dimension, was generally supported. In 
two studies (Study 1 & 2), but not in the third one, consensus and distinctiveness 
particularly affected actor judgments if the alternative dimension was high. In all three 
studies, consensus and distinctiveness particularly affected patient judgments if the 
alternative dimension was low.  
Moreover, both dimensions affected judgments most when information about the 
alternative dimension was absent (Study 2 & 3). The latter finding might seem trivial: If 
no other information is available, it seems logical that observers use the information 
they do have more heavily. Yet our finding is relevant in the light of Rose et al. (2011) 
who found that people use consensus information more when they are aware of a 
potential situational explanation for an event than when they are not aware of such an 
explanation. From the actor’s point of view, patient causation is a type of situational 
causation. Rose et al.’s finding might therefore be interpreted as showing that consensus 
information affects causal attributions more in the presence of distinctiveness 
information than in its absence. Showing the opposite, our findings support Rose et al. 
(2011)’s interpretation in terms of an effect of information about a causal mechanism 
and not of an effect of general situational information.  
The asymmetry hypothesis was consistently supported. Two of our studies put it to 
test (Study 2 & 3). As Grice’s logic of conversations implies, in both studies high 
consensus and low distinctiveness influenced causal judgments more than low 
consensus and high distinctiveness did.  
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Although our research aimed at testing three specific hypotheses about the use of 
different types of covariation information, it broadly adds to the general literature on the 
relative use and search of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency. Most research on 
the relative search for consensus versus distinctiveness information originated in early 
studies suggesting that distinctiveness affected causal judgments more than consensus 
did (Bruce, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975; DiVitto & McArthur, 1978; Kassin, 1979; 
McArthur, 1972, 1976; Wright, Lüüs & Christie, 1990; see, however, Försterling, 1989; 
Iacobucci & McGill, 1990). Later studies revealed that the underuse of consensus was 
by far not as general as once thought (e.g. Hansen & Donoghue, 1977; Hilton, Smith, & 
Alicke, 1988; Quayle & Naidoo, 2012; Rose, Windschitl, & Jenson, 2011; Ruble & 
Feldman, 1976; Wells & Harvey, 1977). It was suggested to depend on, among other 
factors, on the nature of the attribution question being answered. We showed that 
predictable regularities exist not only in the search and evaluation of covariation 
information but also in its actual use. 
Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
We did not strive to test the general validity of Kelley’s covariation principle or to 
challenge alternative formulations (e.g. Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992; 
Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; Hilton, 2007; Hilton & Jaspars, 1987; Hilton & Sluhosky, 
1986; Jaspars, 1983; Jaspars, Hewstone, & Fincham, 1983; see also Perales & Shanks, 
2003). We merely tested, from a Gricean point of view, whether the implicit 
assumptions of the covariation model about the use of covariation information 
characterize actual causal judgments of verbally described interpersonal events. One 
conclusion from our findings is that the standard presentation of the model as a perfect 
cube cannot generally be maintained for these particular stimulus events. The cube 
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presentation suggests that the assumptions of equal, independent, and symmetrical use 
are met by default. We showed that, for interpersonal events communicated through 
verbal descriptions, this is not sufficiently true to warrant such a generalization. Our 
research thus shows that applications of the covariation model may profit from a 
Gricean complement. Adding such a complement, at least in the case of attributions for 
verbally communicated events, places the attribution process within the conversational 
context that often surrounds it. Moreover, it allows explaining attribution patterns that 
are otherwise hard to understand. 
On a more speculative level, our research implies a plea for a clear distinction 
between various aspects of the attribution process. Our reading of the literature 
suggested that causal judgments, information searches, and information judgments are 
often taken as different measurements of the same underlying process. Yet, judgments 
of the normative influence of covariation information may not tap into the same 
behavior as actual causal judgments do. It would therefore be interesting to examine 
whether the covariation model mainly holds as a model of actual causal attributions 
versus as a model for (normative or descriptive) lay beliefs about causal attribution. 
Also on a speculative level, our findings plea for the desirability of a clear 
distinction, in future research, between social and nonsocial events to be used as stimuli 
in causal attribution studies. Previous tests supporting the covariation model have 
mostly used nonsocial events. Our research, uniquely including social events, cast doubt 
on some of the model’s basic assumptions being always followed. It thus points at the 
possibility that people explain social versus nonsocial events differently. Taken to its 
extreme, the covariation model, though mostly used to understand how people interpret 
social interactions, may above all hold for nonsocial events. 
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Our suggestions for future research follow from these implications. We recommend 
that studies on causal attribution systematically compare attribution processes for social 
and nonsocial events and carefully distinguish between the various aspects of attribution 
processes. Most of all, however, we recommend further explorations of how 
conversational contexts may affect attribution processes.  
Limitations 
One obvious limitation of our research was that the results were not totally 
consistent. The support for the attribution question hypothesis was less uniform in 
Studies 2-3 than in Study 1. The support for the interdependence hypothesis was less 
uniform in Study 3 than in Studies 1-2. 
One explanation for the poorer support for the interdependence hypothesis in Study 
3 than in Studies 1-2 may be that, upon encountering unexpected consensus or 
distinctiveness information, participants in Study 3 could devote part of their enhanced 
attention to the consistency information. Despite the observed evidence for the 
attribution question and the interdependence hypothesis being not as uniform as the 
evidence for the asymmetry hypothesis, however, the overall pattern of results was 
strong enough to doubt whether the assumptions underlying the covariation model hold 
in the case of causal judgments about verbally described interpersonal events.  
One more general explanation that could account for all inconsistencies may be 
based on the increasing repetitiveness of the stimuli over studies. Participants in Study 1 
saw 18 events with four covariation combinations. Those in Study 2 responded to six 
events with nine combinations. Participants in Study 3 responded to three events in 27 
combinations. The increasing repetitiveness may have created increasing levels of 
boredom or confusion and thus have rendered it difficult for significant effects to occur. 
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This issue may in future studies be addressed by using larger samples of participants, 
each causally judging a limited set of events. 
It is probably also the additional manipulation of levels (from Study 1 to Study 2)  
and consistency information (from Study 2 to Study 3) that made the subject and object 
judgments correlate ever more negatively. It will be remembered that Experiment 3 was 
the sole study to yield a considerable correlation between object and subject ratings (be 
it not a perfect one, and even not a correlation that would psychometrically warrant the 
combination of items). So why did participants in Study 3 treat the subject and object to 
a larger extent as complementary causal agents than participants in Study 1 and Study 2 
did? One explanation may be that Study 3 was the sole study in which there were no 
fewer than three covariation dimensions (consensus, distinctiveness, consistency) of 
which participants encountered three levels of information (high, low, absent), each 
combination of covariation information to be applied to each stimulus event. This 
encompassing set-up may have provoked the idea among participants that they 
encountered all possible combinations that a researcher could reasonably come up with 
and that such rendered it possible to evaluate whether their responses were internally 
consistent. They may therefore have tried to be as consistent and logical as possible in 
their answers, thus giving subject and object ratings that were strongly negatively 
correlated.  
A completely different limitation of our research is that we examined causal 
judgments rather than asking open questions about the causes of interpersonal events. 
This choice was inspired by one of the hypotheses being tested (namely, the attribution 
question hypothesis). At the same time, it was consistent with previous research on the 
covariation model in particular and causal attribution in general. Future research may 
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examine to which extent asymmetry and interdependence phenomena also occur in 
idiosyncratic causal attributions.  
In addition, we examined how people use different types of covariation information 
when they do use covariation information. Whereas people may and sometimes do use 
covariation information, they sometimes apply heuristics or knowledge and beliefs 
about potential mechanisms to assess causality instead (for a review see, for instance, 
Malle, 2004). Yet our research was not meant to determine when people use covariation 
information or to suggest that people predominantly or most of the time use covariation 
information. We merely tested if, when people do use covariation information, the 
assumptions underlying the covariation model are borne out.  
Deviations of rationality or functional information use? 
The covariation model is sometimes used as a normative model of human 
attribution (cf. White, 2002; Försterling & Binser, 2002; Schimansky, Rössler, & Haker 
2012; Schuster, Ruble, & Weinert, 1998). To the extent that normative logic dictates 
rational judgment, the phenomena we observed may be viewed as deviations of 
rationality. Yet, such a conclusion would be based on one particular and rather narrow 
view of rationality. Rather than viewing the observed phenomena as ‘violations’ of 
logic, let alone rationality, we would like to ask which social function they may serve.  
It is possible, for instance, that differentially weighting different types of 
covariation information is effective from an approach-avoidance point of view. Another 
possibility is that the observed phenomena reflect real-life knowledge people 
accumulate during their lifetimes. If it is true that patients whom many actors treat in 
similar manners have generally caused this treatment themselves, there is no such thing 
like a ‘violation’ of whatever rule if observers focus on consensus rather than on 
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distinctiveness when wondering about the patient’s causal role. Within our Gricean 
framework, however, it is even more plausible that the covariation information that 
people infer from verbal communications reflects the covariation information that the 
communicator wished to convey. By saying that Peter kissed Mary, communicators may 
indeed share the insight that such is worth mentioning – and hence, that it is a rather 
remarkable event. Assuming that it says something specific about either the actor or the 
patient – or both – may thus simply be an effective manner for the receivers of the 
message to take part in the communicator’s knowledge. 
Conclusion 
While explaining interpersonal events, people seem to sometimes use consensus and 
distinctiveness information interdependently, asymmetrically, and depending on whose 
causal role they try to assess. This is particularly true when they explain interpersonal 
events about which they are informed by verbal communication. It is predicted by a 
Gricean analysis of the conversational context in which people exchange behavioral 
information. Future research in the domain of causal attribution might therefore profit 
from taking this conversational context into account. 
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Table 1 Mean Causality Ratings As A Function of Interactant, Consensus, 
Distinctiveness, and Consistency 
 
 
 Actor Patient 
 
Distinctiveness 
High  
Consensus 
No 
Consensus 
Low 
Consensus 
High 
Consensus 
No 
Consensus 
Low 
Consensus 
  
Study 1 
  
High  5.1  5.9 6.4  5.2 
Low  6.7  7.1 5.9  3.9 
  
Study 2 
  
High  4.9 5.4 6.3 6.8 6.4 6.8 
No  4.8 6.3 7.4 6.8 5.2 3.9 
Low  6.6 7.5 7.3 6.2 3.1 3.6 
  
Study 3 
  
Low consistency 
High  6.1 6.4 6.5 5.2 4.7 4.3 
No  6.2 6.4 6.5 5.1 4.5 4.1 
Low  6.8 7.0 7.0 4.8 4.0 3.8 
  
No consistency 
High  6.2 6.5 6.8 5.3 5.1 4.6 
No  5.8 6.9 7.3 5.6 4.0 3.7 
Low  6.9 7.5 7.4 4.9 3.0 3.6 
  
High consistency 
High  6.5 6.8 6.8 5.2 4.7 4.7 
No  6.3 7.1 7.3 5.5 4.3 3.8 
Low  6.9 7.4 7.5 5.0 3.5 3.4 
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Figure 1. The effect of consensus and distinctiveness information (expressed as the 
absolute magnitude of the high-low difference) on actor and patient causality ratings 
as a function of the information on alternative dimension (Study 1). 
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